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Abstract: 
 
With the continued implementation of the personalisation policy, Personal 
Budgets (PBs) have moved to the mainstream in adult social care in England. 
The relationship between the policy goals of personalisation and safeguarding 
is contentious. Some have argued that PBs have the potential to empower 
recipients, while others believe PBs, especially Direct Payments, might 
increase the risk of abuse.  
 
This paper provides empirical evidence about levels of uptake of PBs and 
safeguarding referrals in England based on in-depth analysis of national data 
at aggregate, local council level in England, covering 152 Councils. This is 
complemented by analysis of 2,209 individual referral records obtained from 
three purposively selected study sites. The aim is to explore whether available 
data could provide evidence of association between the uptake of PBs and 
safeguarding referrals. Analysis of the national dataset found no significant 
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relationships between PB uptake and the level and type of alleged abuse. 
However, analysis of individual level referral data, from the three selected 
sites did find some significant associations particularly with financial abuse; 
and t the main perpetrators of the alleged abuse to be home care employees. 
The findings are discussed within the context of current policy and practice 
context. 
 
Introduction 
Long term care (LTC) is one of the most rapidly developed policy areas in the 
majority of the developed world. This, in part, is due to ageing demographics 
but also the cost of providing LTC whatever the welfare mix. LTC policies 
need to achieve a number of competing outcomes, including expansion of 
coverage and cost containment, while recognising individuals’ citizenship, as 
well as consumers, rights and promoting quality of care provision (Daly, 
2012). These policy developments recognise, to some extent, LTC as part of 
citizens’ basic needs where the state holds certain duties in recognising and 
meeting these needs. However, these policies have also been implemented 
within a context of fiscal challenges in the majority of the European countries, 
where the level of state funded LTC varies considerably. Within this context, 
the policy of personalisation, has become increasingly central as a policy 
objective.  
 
Across advanced economies governments are adopting consumer-directed 
‘personalised’, ‘individualised’ or ‘cash-for-care’ schemes as an integral part of 
the provision of long term care (Brennan et al. 2012; Ungerson 1997). These 
schemes provide cash transfers or budget allocations to individual care 
recipients or family caregivers to purchase care services (Colombo et al. 
2011, p. 11), or allocate a certain budget, which is then ‘managed’ by social 
services. A central aim of such personalisation schemes is to enhance 
independence, choice and control by placing people receiving publicly funded 
care at the ‘centre’ of their own support, in principle tailoring support to their 
individual needs (Carr, 2012) and providing them with more choice about the 
type of help they receive, when they receive it and who provides it, 
Personalisation, thus, aims to enable those in need of care to exercise choice 
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and control as consumers to meet their particular needs and preferences, 
rather than having to access standardised services. It is also considered by 
some to provide a means of cost containment by the state (Pavolini and 
Ranci, 2014) and that it has come to embody a set of values that set it apart 
from person-centred care (Woolham et al., 2015). However, the provision of 
cash-for-care, or Personal Budgets (PB) as it is known in England, can also 
be regarded as a form of family-oriented policy to address the burden of 
family carers, by providing them with financial support directly or indirectly 
(Bayern, 2008).  Meanwhile they can produce significant changes in the 
labour market and organisation of paid care work, which can entail substantial 
risks for job quality, income and working time security, health and safety, skill 
development and representation (Beresford, 2014; Glendinning 2012; Leece 
2010; Ungerson & Yeandle 2007). 
 
In England where social care is means tested, Personal Budgets (PBs) are an 
important means of implementing the policy of personalisation (HM 
Government, 2007). This involves an assessment of needs which is used to 
allocate a sum of money judged to be sufficient to purchase the support or 
equipment needed by the eligible individual. PBs can be managed by local 
council staff (as a Managed Personal Budget - MPB) or offered, either in full 
or in part, as a Direct Payment (DP) to eligible individuals. DPs were declared 
‘the preferred option’ (Department of Health [DH], 2010) when offering PBs to 
eligible individuals. PB implementation thus has become core to councils’ 
social care activity. In 2011, over 338,000 people were reported to have a PB, 
including 125,000 DP recipients, an increase from 107,000 in 2009-10 
(Gheera, 2012).  
 
The original commitment to provide PBs followed a policy direction 
established in the Community Care (Direct Payments) Act 1996. In 2000, 
provision of DPs was extended to include older people. Later, the government 
placed a ‘duty’ on local councils to offer DPs to eligible people who were 
judged to be able to manage them with or without assistance, meaning that 
proxies (typically family members) are permitted to manage such 
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arrangements if it is in the best interests of the eligible individual. The Care 
Act (2014)1 strengthens this policy through its Statutory Guidance: 
 
Everyone whose needs are met by the local authority … must receive a 
personal budget as part of the care and support plan, or support plan (DH, 
2014, 152 Emphasis in original).  
 
Earlier studies revealed that some perceived risks of PBs stemmed from a 
perception that they could only be available as cash payments (Glendinning et 
al., 2008): however, as noted above, PBs may be taken or managed in 
different ways. With MPBs, care managers help recipients, if necessary, to 
make decisions about the kinds of support required and then commission care 
providers to deliver this support within the calculated budget. Individuals 
choosing a DP make their own arrangements for purchasing services, often 
with support from families and sometimes from third sector organisations such 
as Centres for Independent Living. PBs might also involve ‘hybrid’ 
arrangements whereby part of the budget is taken as a DP and part is 
managed on the person’s behalf.  
 
The central argument around PBs and the wider policy of personalisation is 
that they offer greater independence, choice and control; goals for which 
younger disabled people have campaigned since the mid-1980s. Early 
commentators argued that this development would be key to reshaping 
welfare delivery in a way that is beneficial to end users (for example, Oliver & 
Sapey, 1999). It has also been argued that enhanced choice may inherently 
promote safeguarding (or freedom from abuse or neglect) because care users 
can choose who provides their support and how it is provided. This potentially 
‘creates the correct framework for preventing abuse by strengthening 
citizenship and communities’ (Duffy & Gillespie, 2009; Tyson, 2008)). The 
conceptual basis for this argument is that personalisation creates the 
conditions necessary for individualised tailored services that are difficult to 
achieve through a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach (Boxall et al., 2009). Such 
arrangements could be perceived to improve individuals’ autonomy and 
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enhance their decisions around care, which in turn may improve their 
wellbeing and overall safety (Glasby, 2011). 
 
However, scepticism has also been expressed about the potential of PBs to 
meet social care outcomes, particularly when extended to other groups of 
people with eligible social care needs including older people (e.g. Mickel, 
2008, Slasberg, Beresford & Schofield, 2012, Barnes 2011, Lloyd 2010, 
Woolham et al.,,2016). Particular concerns have been voiced about potential 
risks for vulnerable individuals and those who may lack decision making 
capacity and for whom ‘Suitable Persons’ hold the money (Schwehr, 2010). 
Concerns about risks of financial exploitation and abuse in particular were 
voiced by participants in several studies (see for example Henwood and 
Hudson, 2007; and more recently Manthorpe and Samsi, 2013). Some have 
also argued that personalisation may become too persuasive a term to judge 
its suitability objectively, especially when combined with marketisation and 
outsourcing of services. Marketisation of care is contentious when care users 
are constructed as consumers and care as a commodity to be bought and 
sold. Marketization has increased the role of the private sector in delivering 
care and the centrality of profit where suppliers of all sizes must operate in 
competitive markets and reduce costs. This is combined with reduced funding 
from central government in many European countries, following the banking  
crises of 2008, contributing to continuing problems associated with low wages 
and poor working conditions (Hussein, 2011; Gardner and Hussein, 2015) as 
well as  lack of proper training and  concerns about the care quality (Lewis 
and West, 2014). While England was the first European country to marketise 
the social care sector through progressive outsourcing programmes and later 
personalisation policies (Pavolini and Ranci, 2008) most Nordic countries 
have followed suit, yet with much smaller share of the market but with 
reported implications for inequalities in the provision of care services as well 
as working conditions (Brennan et al., 2012). To the extent that these reforms 
shift responsibility from the state back on to individual, and sometimes 
vulnerable, citizens, safeguarding concerns, among other risks, should 
therefore be considered critically by policy makers as well as frontline social 
workers (Ferguson, 2007). 
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Balancing empowerment and safeguarding is thus an important consideration 
when implementing the personalisation agenda and may involve a complex 
process of negotiation, risk-assessment and management. The current 
analysis takes as its theoretical point of departure, these different 
perspectives around personalisation, specifically in the form of PBs, and 
safeguarding in adult social care in England.  
 
The analysis and findings presented in this paper form part of a larger mixed-
method study (Stevens et al. 2014) examining possible relationships between 
PBs, in particular DPs, and patterns of alleged abuse among people in receipt 
of social care services. The paper presents quantitative analysis from this 
research with the core aim of investigating possible links between levels and 
patterns of alleged abuse and the receipt of different forms of PB (MPBs and 
DPs), using nationally and locally collected data on referrals of abuse and 
receipt of PBs. In particular, it focuses on an exploration of the conceptual 
links between PB and: risks of abuse; the alleged perpetrators  (e.g. family 
members or main carers; and home care workers such as directly-employed 
Personal Assistants or those working for care agencies. The paper also aims 
to explore the patterns and levels of other types of alleged abuse visited upon 
those receiving PBs. In doing this, where the data permits, the paper will 
separately analyse abuse experienced by those receiving DPs and MPBs to 
investigate if there is any evidence to suggest that one or the other type of PB 
is more or likely to be associated with abuse or safeguarding concerns.  
 
Data and methods 
The findings and discussion presented here are based on analysis of two 
types of data. The first are national safeguarding (Abuse of Vulnerable Adults 
(AVA) data) and Adult Social Care Combined Return (ASC-CAR)  data. These 
summarise data provided by English local councils at the local council, rather 
than the individual, or case, level. The second type of data, which are at an 
individual level, come from three purposively selected councils. These were 
also analysed to explore any relationships. This could be done  in more depth 
because the data was not aggregated. Within the three councils participating 
in the study, interviews were also undertaken that aimed to explore links 
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between safeguarding and personalisation at practice and service user 
experience levels. Findings from these qualitative interviews are reported 
elsewhere (Stevens et al., 2014 and 2016). The data relates to the years 2010 
and 2012, and the study took place between 2011-2014. The study received 
ethical approval from the Dyfed Powys Research Ethics Committee (Ref 
12/WA/0191) and relevant local research governance approvals. 
 
Though both AVA and ASC-CAR returns provide data on all 152 CASSRs  in 
England, the basic unit of analysis was the council itself because the data is 
presented by HSCIC in aggregate. This meant we were able to investigate our 
research questions at council rather than individual service user level. The 
initial analysis used 2010-11 returns but repeated these using 2011-12 data 
subsequently to ensure up-to-date sources were used. It should also be noted 
that the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults returns from local councils have 
subsequently been replaced by Safeguarding Adult Returns.  
In addition to the national data we collected anonymised individual data on 
referrals in three purposively selected research sites (referred to as local 
data), investigating 2,209 individual referral records, however, the number of 
individuals with DP only was relatively small (n=88).  
 
Figure 1 presents a description of data used for the analysis. 
 
Figure 1 Data used for analysis 
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The Adult Social Care Outcomes Framework, England (HSCIS, 2014) counts 
a user as receiving Self-Directed Support (SDS) when the person (adult, older 
person or carer) ‘must either: be in receipt of a direct payment; or have in 
place a personal budget which meets all the following criteria:  
1. The person (or their representative) has been informed about a clear, 
upfront allocation of funding, enabling them to plan their support 
arrangements; and  
2. There is an agreed support plan making clear what outcomes are to be 
achieved with the funding;  
3. The person (or their representative) can use the funding in ways and at 
times of their choosing’.  
 
In addition to AVA and ASC-CAR datasets, Referrals, Assessments and 
Packages of Care (RAP) and the Adult Social Care Combined Activity Return 
(ASC-CAR) separate the number of people receiving a MPB from the number 
of people in receipt of DPs2. To investigate any links between local area 
characteristics and our research questions, these AVA and ASC-CAR 
datasets were also linked to other indicators; namely: the English Indices of 
Deprivation sub-scales of unemployment and poverty (Nobel et al., 2008) and 
level of rurality3 (Office of National Statistics). Using these additional data 
sources we derived a number of indicators at local council level likely to reflect 
proxies for uptake of DPs or MPBs among different groups of service users. 
These indicators, along with other local authority characteristics (deprivation 
and level of rurality) were used to investigate patterns of referral in relation to 
local council characteristics. Box 1 presents the ten explanatory indicators 
derived from the aggregate data at the local council level. The first group of 
variables show the percentage of DP users by age group (variables 1 and 4 in 
Box 1); the second group shows the combined percentage of those using DPs 
and MPBs (variables 2 and 5 in Box 1); and the third group of variables show 
the percentage of people using any form of Self-Directed Support (variables 3 
and 6 in Box 1). The challenges of using these aggregate datasets are 
discussed elsewhere (Ismail et al., forthcoming). 
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Our three Individual research sites provided information about whether 
service users received a DP or MPB; however, definitions of DP and MPB 
seemed to differ slightly between sites. In this paper, therefore, the term 
‘MPB’ may include various elements of DP or MPB. Local councils appeared 
to classify those in receipt of a ‘cash’ payment clearly as DP users but 
categorisation of MPB was less clear. This affected the kind of analysis 
possible, and meant that though it was possible to infer relationships within 
the general uptake of PBs, it was more difficult to distinguish between those in 
receipt of a DP or MPB.  
 
We also asked the three local councils for detailed information of referrals of 
abuse during the two years prior to the analysis (to cover 2010-2012) 
including details of whether the suspected or alleged victims received any 
1. P_DP18_64: Percentage of users aged 18-64 who are identified to 
receive direct payments (DP) out of all users receiving community 
based services (CBS). 
2. P_SDSDP18_64: Percentage of users aged 18-64 who either receive 
Managed Personal Budget (MPB) or DP among all service users aged 
18-64 receiving CBS. 
3. P_SDS18_64: Percentage of service users aged 18-64 receiving MPB of 
all 18-64 users receiving CBS. 
4. P_DP65: Percentage of service users aged 65 years or more receiving 
DP among all users aged 65+ receiving CBS. 
5. P_SDSDP65: Percentage of users aged 65 years or more receiving MPB 
or direct payments out of all clients aged clients receiving CBS. 
6. P_SDS65: Percentage of users aged 65 years or more receiving MPB 
out of all clients 65+ users receiving CBS 
7. depAvgScore: Whether the local authority is on low, medium or high 
level of the English deprivation overall score 
8. IncomeScale: Whether the local authority is on low, medium or high 
level of the English income deprivation score 
9. EmpScale: Whether the local authority is on low, medium or high level 
of the English employment deprivation score.  
10.Level of rurality: ‘Predominantly Rural’ (R50 and R80), ‘Significant Rural’ 
(SR), or ‘Predominantly Urban’ (OU, MU, and LU) 
Box	1	Local authority indicators of uptake of personal budgets, deprivation 
and rurality 
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form of PBs at the time of referrals. The three sites responded to our request 
for data with varying degrees of completeness. Table 1 provides a summary 
of characteristics of safeguarding referrals in the local data. 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of individual safeguarding referrals from the 
three study sites  
  Site A Site B Site C 
 Characteristics of cases N % N % N % 
Process of referral on 
AVA 
      Incomplete 
  
158 32.38 
  No 713 76.09 33 6.76 
  Yes 224 23.91 297 60.86 
  Type of abuse 
      Physical 396 42.26 151 30.94 208 26.53 
Emotional or 
psychological 252 26.89 
    Sexual 58 6.19 
    Financial or material 177 18.89 19 3.89 169 21.56 
Neglect or deprivation 299 31.91 
    Location of abuse (own 
home) 389 41.52 258 52.87 50 6.38 
Relation to alleged 
abuser 
      Domiciliary care staff  152 16.22 28 5.74 
  Family member 187 19.96 
  
39 4.97 
Total number of cases 937  488  784  
 
 
In presenting our findings, particularly those relating to the national datasets, 
we employed data visualisation techniques, specifically the use of box-plots to 
facilitate summarising and comparing several factors simultaneously. Each 
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box-plot shows ‘notches’ at the median point to enable a visual judgment to 
be made of how significant the difference between the three distributions is 
likely to be (Chambers et al., 1983); (where notches overlap there is no 
statistical differences between the distributions). Local councils were grouped 
into 3-level categorical variables according to their distribution by each of our 
10 explanatory variables (except for their level of rurality, where they were 
grouped as PU ’Predominantly Urban’; SR ’Significantly Rural’ and PR 
’Predominantly Rural’). For each indicator, local councils can score a level of 
low, medium or high according to how their data is distributed. For example, 
for the first explanatory variable (P DP18 64), local councils data are 
distributed according to the proportion of 18-64 year old users who receive 
PBs (low: first third of the distribution, medium: second third and high: top 
third). The statistical analyses and graphical visualisation were carried out 
using R-Statistical Environment (ver 3.1) on Unix (R Development Core 
Team, 2007). 
 
Findings: 
Using our derived indicators of levels of PBs uptake within local councils by 
different age groups and levels of local deprivation and rurality, the analysis of 
the national aggregate data indicated no significant difference in the median 
and distribution of number of referrals across local councils with various levels 
of PBs uptake. The analysis suggested slightly higher levels of referral and 
repeated referrals in significantly rural areas. Data obtained from the three 
local council study sites showed that proportionally more referrals were 
reported on councils’ AVA data returns about people receiving either a DP or 
a MPB when compared to those not appearing to receive any type of PB. For 
example, 40% of allegations related to people receiving DPs were reported on 
AVA, compared to 22% among those who did not receive any element of a 
PB (χ2= 5.957, P=0.015).  
 
Nature of alleged abuse 
Analysis of AVA returns indicated that the most common forms reported were 
physical abuse followed by financial abuse. In 2011-12 local councils reported 
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an average of 139 referrals for people aged 65 years and over with an 
element of physical abuse (min=5 4 , median= 100, max=1060) and 101 
referrals involving financial abuse (min=5, median= 82, max= 660). Other 
forms of abuse, such as emotional and sexual abuse, were reported less 
often. On average, each local council reported 67 referrals involving 
allegations of emotional abuse (min=0, median=50, max=590) and 14 
referrals involving sexual abuse (min=0, median=10, max=100) for people 
aged 65 and over. A similar pattern of reported allegations of abuse was 
observed for referrals relating to people aged 18-64 years old. 
 
Financial abuse 
We used the derived indicators of levels of PB uptake within local councils by 
different age groups and levels of local deprivation and rurality, as explained 
above, to explore possible relationships between the ten key explanatory 
variables. These analyses are presented in Figure 2, indicating a very similar 
distribution of referrals across local councils despite different levels of uptake 
of DPs and MPB (first two rows of graphs). There were no clear differences 
associated with local area deprivation levels for both income and employment 
deprivation. However, there were slight, but not significant, differences in 
financial abuse in relation to level of rurality. 
  
Analysis of individual referral records from the local data, shown in Table 2, 
also revealed no significant differences in levels of allegations of financial 
abuse between those in receipt of DP and those not receiving any form of 
PBs (16% compared to 15%). To examine these differences further, we 
conducted a logistic regression model, utilising all local data, examining the 
relationships between individual factors and receiving PB through either a DP 
or MPB on the probability of allegations of financial abuse. A total of 2209 
individual records were included in the regression model and the results of the 
final model are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 2 Results of logistic regression models to examine prevalence of financial abuse and alleged abuser to be 
domiciliary care staff, using individual cases obtained from three study sites 
Logistic Regression results Model I: Financial Abuse  
Model II: Alleged abuser: 
Domiciliary care staff   
  LI Odds Ratio UI p-value LI OR UI p-value 
(Intercept) 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.000 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.000 
Type of service (Ref: No PBs)         
Receive Direct payments 0.41 0.77 1.35 0.385 0.61 1.19 2.22 0.598 
Receive Self-directed support 1.34 1.70*** 2.16 0.000 2.69 3.89*** 5.66 0.000 
Age (ref: 18-64 )           
 65+ 0.73 0.96 1.28 0.803 0.94 1.46 2.31 0.096 
Unknown 0.27 0.94 2.58 0.915 4.44 15.74*** 55.79 0.000 
User group (ref: Learning Disability)            
Mental health 0.48 0.79 1.30 0.357 0.11 0.29** 0.70 0.009 
Other 0.79 1.20 1.85 0.399 0.30 0.62 1.25 0.188 
Physical disability 1.02 1.52* 2.27 0.040 0.76 1.30 2.23 0.342 
Ethnicity (ref: White British)           
BME 0.50 0.97 1.73 0.911 0.05 0.33 1.12 0.132 
Unknown 0.46 0.67 0.96 0.034 0.32 0.71 1.39 0.347 
Gender (ref: Female)           
Male 0.93 1.18 1.49 0.179 0.88 1.26 1.79 0.208 
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Figure 2 Distributions of aggregate referrals with nature of financial 
abuse, for users 65+, local authority level 
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The only significant associations were observed among people in receipt of a 
MPB and those with reported physical disability; with increased likelihood of 
allegations of financial abuse when compared to those not in receipt of any 
forms of PB and those with no physical disabilities (Odds Ratio 1.7, CI (1.34-
2.16), P<0.001 and OR=1.52, CI (1.02-2.27), P=0.04, respectively). This 
suggests a small increase in the likelihood of a referral being made on the 
grounds of alleged financial abuse for MPB users.  
 
Table 3 Prevalence of different types of alleged abuse and alleged 
abuser among users in receipt of Direct Payment (DP); Self-Directed 
Support (MPB) and those who do not receive Personal Budgets in cases 
of referrals obtained from the three study sites 
Characteristics of 
referral 
Type of Service  
DP MPB Neither 
(Traditional 
services) 
Total 
Alleged abuser: 
Domiciliary worker (N) 
15 101 64 180 
% 17.0% 17.2% 4.2% 8.1% 
Alleged abuser: Family 
member† (N) 
17 98 333 448 
% 19.3% 16.7% 21.7% 20.3% 
Alleged abuser: Other§ 
(N) 
56 389 1136 1581 
% 63.6% 66.2% 74.1% 71.6% 
Type of Alleged Abuse     
Physical (N) 37 166 552 755 
% 42.0% 28.2% 36.0% 34.2% 
Emotional (N) 16 61 234 311 
% 18.2% 10.4% 15.3% 14.1% 
Sexual (N) 2 24 64 90 
% 2.3% 4.1% 4.2% 4.1% 
Neglect (N) 19 109 194 322 
% 21.6% 18.5% 12.7% 14.6% 
Financial (N) 14 125 226 365 
% 15.9% 21.3% 14.7% 16.5% 
Total number of cases 88 588 1533 2209 
 
† Includes partner or other family member 
§ Includes day care staff; neighbour/friend; not known; other; other professional; 
other vulnerable adult; residential care staff; social worker/care manager; stranger; 
volunteer/befriender 
χ2(12) = 133.8, p-value < 0.001 
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Other types of abuse 
Using national aggregate national data, the analysis did not indicate any clear 
relationship between the level of uptake of DPs and level of referrals of 
physical abuse. For example, the median number of referrals involving 
allegations of physical abuse was 80 cases per local council among local 
councils with a low uptake of DP for people aged 18-64 years; 82.5 cases 
among those with median level of uptake, and 85 cases among those with 
high level of uptake. These differences in the median were not statistically 
significant. Analysis of individual records did not indicate a significant 
relationship between the uptake of MPBs or DPs and the likelihood of being 
referred for physical abuse although there were differences between those 
identified as having a DP and those receiving other types of PBs. For 
example, people with MPBs showed a significantly lower prevalence of 
allegations of physical abuse compared to those receiving a DP and those not 
receiving any forms of PBs (28% vs. 42% and 36% respectively, χ2= 7.769, 
P<0.001; Table 2).  
 
Analysis of the national datasets indicated that the distribution of referrals 
involving allegations of emotional abuse were almost identical amongst local 
councils with different levels of DPs and MPB uptake. Analysis of individual 
records from our three sites, presented in Table 2, indicated some significant 
differences in allegations of emotional abuse according to whether people 
received some forms of PB. For those in receipt of DPs there was a higher 
prevalence of allegations of emotional abuse (18%) compared to those with 
MPBs (10%) and compared to those who did not receive any form of PBs 
(15%).  
 
Figure 3 visually represents the distributions of referrals arising from 
allegations of sexual abuse, by level of uptake of PBs within individual local 
councils and local area characteristics. Box-plots presented in the first two 
rows of Figure 3 show no significant differences in the prevalence of alleged 
sexual abuse and uptake of DP and MPB at local council level. However, the 
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analysis of national data suggests a tentative relationship between allegation 
of sexual abuse and local deprivation level (see third row of Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Distributions of aggregate referrals with nature of sexual abuse 
for users 65+, local authority level 
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unable to capture using current datasets. There were also some differences 
according to level of rurality; with median referrals for alleged sexual abuse 
being higher, but not significantly so, in rural areas.  
 
Individual records from the three local councils were analysed to investigate 
the same factors. Information on referrals involving sexual abuse allegations 
was not provided by site C. Table 2 shows the percentage of referrals with 
allegations of sexual abuse was two per cent among people who did not 
receive DPs compared to four per cent amongst people receiving MPB and 
similar percentage among those receiving traditional services. The latter 
suggesting a lower prevalence of reported allegations of sexual abuse among 
the small group of those receiving DPs, this might be linked to available 
mechanisms to report these particularly sensitive allegations but also might be 
due to the relatively small number of this group (n=88). 
 
Relationship of alleged abuser to alleged victim 
Care workers as alleged abusers 
National aggregate data analysis indicated that each local council reported an 
average of 51 allegations of abuse where the alleged abuser was a home 
care worker (median=37, max=345). Very few local councils reported any 
referrals where alleged abusers were self-directed support paid workers [i.e. 
workers directly employed by users in receipt of PBs such as Personal 
Assistants] (mean=3, median=0), thus it was not possible to investigate this 
further. Analysis of aggregate data indicated no significant differences in the 
distributions of allegations of abuse by home care staff as the abuser 
according to different indicators of uptake of PBs at local council level. 
However, we found some slight differences in the prevalence of allegations 
related to home care staff according to income and employment deprivation 
scale at the local authority level.  
 
Examination of individual records from the three local councils found a higher 
prevalence of referrals where alleged abusers were home care workers 
among users in receipt of PBs - both DPs and MPB - compared to allegations 
involving other people - including family, other staff, or volunteers (for details 
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see footnote on Table 2). Table 2 shows that 17 per cent of safeguarding 
referrals of people in receipt of DPs or MPB involved allegations in relation to 
home care staff; this compared to only 4 per cent among people not receiving 
DPs (χ2= 9.931; P<0.001). To investigate this association further, we 
conducted a logistic regression model on data obtained from sites A and B 
with 1425 cases included in the model (Site C did not include information on 
whether the alleged abuser was a home care worker). The regression model 
examined this association while controlling for other individual alleged victims’ 
characteristics including age, gender, ethnicity and type of needs (classified 
as physical disability, learning disability, mental health and other). The results 
of the logistic regression model are presented in the second set of columns in 
Table 3. The analysis indicated a significantly positive association between 
receiving MPB and the likelihood of the alleged abuser being a home care 
worker  (OR=3.89, CI (2.69- 5.66), P<0.001). By contrast, referrals of people 
with mental health needs had a significantly lower likelihood of being the 
subject of a safeguarding referral involving home care staff as alleged 
abusers (OR=0.29, CI (0.11-0.70), P=0.01) (possibly as they receive less 
home care). While the odds ratio of alleged abusers being home care staff 
was higher than that among people who receive DPs when compared to other 
alleged victims, this association was not significant (P=0.60).  
 
 Main carer as alleged abuser 
The number of allegations where the main carer (e.g. family member but also 
other people e.g. friends) was reported to be the abuser was relatively high at 
the national level, with a mean of 721 referrals per local council (min=5, 
median=525, max=4320). The analysis of aggregate data indicated no 
association at the local council level between level of uptake of PBs, level of 
local deprivation or rurality, and the alleged abuser being the main carer. 
Individual referral records did not include any information on whether the 
alleged abuser was the main carer. 
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 Other family member as alleged abuser 
Aggregate information from local councils indicated that on average, 54 
allegations of abuse where the alleged abuser was a family member (but not 
main carer) were reported for each council (min=0, median 30, max 465). 
Distribution of these referrals did not suggest any association with PB uptake, 
deprivation level or level of rurality at the local council level. Furthermore, 
analysis of individual referral records obtained from the three study sites did 
not indicate a clear relationship between receipt of PBs and the alleged 
abuser being a family member. As Table 2 shows, the percentage of users 
receiving DP or MPBs where the alleged abuser was a family member was 
lower than that for people not receiving any forms of PBs (19% and 17% vs. 
22% respectively, but not significantly different- χ2= 0.904; P=0.636).  
 
Discussion 
The analysis presented in this paper examines data in relation to the 
theoretical link between PBs and safeguarding. The analysis is, however, 
limited in a number of ways. These are related to the nature of available data 
on both the uptake of personal budgets and safeguarding referrals. The 
national data included aggregate information at the local council level thus 
inhibiting detailed in-depth analysis of the relationship between receipt of PB 
and different aspects of abuse at the individual user level. This only enabled 
the investigation of proxy relationships via averaged information, thus it might 
not reflect true associations at the individual level, potentially diluting some 
real associations at an individual level. To address this, we analysed 
individual level data from three councils. While the findings based on these 
three local councils offer valuable insight they might not be generalisable 
nationally. However, the large sample of individual records obtained from the 
three sites the relationships observed deserves attention, yet the small 
number of DP holders (n=88) should be acknowledged.  
 
Despite the limitations of this study, this is believed to be the first one to utilise 
national and local datasets to investigate associations between types of 
alleged abuse amongst people receiving MPBs or DPs. Given that the 
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majority of incidents of financial abuse among older people living at home are 
allegedly perpetrated by family members (O’Keefe et al 2007), we 
purposefully focused on investigating whether such individuals are at higher 
risk of allegations of abuse (referrals) from home care workers, main family 
carers or other family members due to the nature of PBs.  
 
People receiving DPs are likely to purchase their care from family, friends and 
others who are not regulated such as directly employed care workers 
(sometimes termed personal assistants (PAs)) and for whom criminal record 
disclosure is not mandatory. Consequently, there is a theoretical risk of 
increased exposure to financial abuse and potentially other types of abuse 
when receiving this form of PB.  
 
Earlier research pointed to the increased risk of financial exploitation and 
levels of abuse for DP holders from the perspective of safeguarding 
practitioners (Samsi, Manthorpe and Chandaria, 2014). Financial abuse 
constituted nearly half of the cases of allegations of abuse that took place in 
domiciliary or home care services reported to the Protection of Vulnerable 
Adults List (Hussein et al., 2009). The current analysis shows that at the local 
council level there were no significant relationships between the levels of 
uptake of PBs and the prevalence of allegations of any type of abuse. 
However, we found indications of increased levels of financial abuse in more 
deprived areas, potentially pointing to a linkage between poverty and financial 
abuse, although in deprived areas there will be more disabled people entitled 
to council funded social care compared to more affluent areas. The financial 
abuse of service users in receipt of PBs might be related to the current 
economic climate and overall cuts to welfare benefits, which potentially 
increase poverty within the family unit, and potentially lead to a situation in 
which the DP comes to be perceived as core family income rather than 
specific to the needs of care users.  
 
The analysis of aggregate at local council level also pointed to a higher 
prevalence of referrals for allegations of sexual abuse within local council 
areas with lower multiple-deprivation (i.e. wealthier areas). These differences 
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were not significant, and may mean that other factors, such as level of 
awareness and active reporting as well as level of trust that vulnerable people 
have in ‘the authority’ are different in more affluent areas and might affect the 
reporting of abuse, but this needs further investigation.  
 
The findings presented in this paper suggest some evidence of higher risk of 
alleged financial abuse among some PB holders including those in receipt of 
DPs and MPBs. It also points to a greater likelihood of the alleged abuser 
being a home care worker when referrals were made concerning those 
defined as people with a MPB by the local council. Additionally, analysis of 
individual referrals highlighted important associations between care users’ 
personal characteristics (and care needs) and the likelihood of allegations of 
financial abuse and place of abuse. However, this could only be established 
from individual cases drawn from a small number of local councils. Analysis of 
aggregate data at the national level produced no clear differences in patterns 
of abuse according to a range of indicators including the overall uptake of PBs 
at aggregate, local council level. These findings are, though, likely to be 
affected by the aggregated nature of the dataset and the consequent 
restrictions this placed upon the kind of analysis possible. At the national 
level, there are some consistent suggestions of different patterns of referral 
for abuse in relation to levels of rurality and local deprivation, which also may 
warrant further research. 
 
Situating the findings of this research within the wider debate of 
personalisation and safeguarding, we find that personalisation, via different 
elements of PBs, may either produce no change in the level of abuse or 
potentially might increase some forms of abuse, especially financial abuse. 
This is consistent with findings from other studies examining the association 
of different outcomes from PBs; such as Activities of Daily Living and General 
Health Questionnaire (Woolham and Benton, 2012); and other measures of 
wellbeing (Glendinning et al., 2008) particularly for older people. A more 
recent study revealed that people with DPs and MPBs experience little 
difference in relation to other outcomes including health, stress and quality of 
life (Woolham et al, 2015) than non-DP holders. 
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On a conceptual level, the link between increased choice and control through 
PB and better safeguarding outcomes does not seem to hold true. This is 
likely to be affected by many factors including the practicalities of PB 
arrangements when balancing and prioritising tight local budgets, individual 
care needs and ideals of empowerment; which encompass social needs and 
choice of who provides care. But it might also be due to a lack of a theoretical 
link between PBs as a vehicle of empowerment and safeguarding. The deeply 
embedded marketisation and privatisation of social care in England that 
preceded the ideal of personalisation, coupled with reduced public funding for 
social care might also have implications for such a conceptual link, reducing 
the positive impact of any increase in or possibly limiting of choice and 
control. Some argue that personalisation is part of a process of privatising risk 
rather than increasing choice and the two to some extent might not go hand in 
hand (Ferguson, 2007).  
 
The findings have some practical implications for people using social care 
services and their family carers as well as for social workers and care 
coordinators when they are planning and reviewing support through the 
provision of different types of PBs. For service users and their carers, there is 
evidence of some increased risk of financial abuse but this is likely to be 
mitigated by individual factors and pre-existing vulnerability. In relation to 
social work practitioners, the findings from the qualitative interviews (Stevens 
et al., 2016) highlight the importance of balancing enablement and risk 
through a proactive and continuous process of support and review when 
MPBs or DPs are offered. They reinforce the dilemma many social work 
practitioners face of promoting greater choice as well as managing and 
reducing risk of harm when implementing PBs within the local regulatory, 
financial and contractual contexts. There is increasing evidence that the role 
of social work practitioners is changing within the context of PBs and the 
findings of this research (Stevens et al., 2016) highlight the importance of 
tactical and evidence based risk management taking centre stage. 
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Our findings also have a number of policy implications.  Firstly, our findings 
support others (e,g, Baxter and Glendinning, 2008) who have suggested that 
councils need to ensure that clear information is provided to budget holders 
about protective behaviours, and should take steps to ensure that this 
information can be understood, providing support where necessary.  We have 
also highlighted some discrepancies between local and national datasets, in 
which local datasets reveal evidence of abuse not picked up nationally 
because of the way the statistical return is produced.  Ideally, Safeguarding 
Adult Returns might contain individual level data. Alternatively, the possibility 
of exploring safeguarding issues in a future user experience survey might be 
considered.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our study found no strong association between a higher uptake of DPs or 
MPBs at the local council level and risk of reported alleged abuse of any type. 
By contrast, the analysis of individual-level safeguarding referral records 
revealed some significant associations between elements of PBs and 
increased risk of allegations of abuse from care workers, especially around 
finance. However, these findings might be linked to a number of other factors 
that were not possible to control for using the data available for analysis 
collected by councils. For example, these include the different circumstances 
of the individuals involved or how significant are PBs in relation to the overall 
family or household income. These could be particularly important given the 
associations observed in relation to the overall deprivation level of an area. 
These findings highlight the important intersection between personalisation 
and safeguarding as two inter-correlated social policy aims. Safeguarding and 
personalisation goals present two key facets of LTC polices that require an 
understanding of how to balance elements of risk when supporting people in 
receipt of PBs. It is now mandatory, in England, to offer PBs to all eligible 
people, suggesting that risk management might become a more pressing 
concern for social workers and other professionals. At an interpersonal level, 
the findings suggest that practitioners should work with care users, family 
members and other supporters to co-produce approaches to care delivery that 
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minimise risks of harm as an integral part of PB support and planning, 
particularly when DPs are being offered.  
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NOTES 																																																								1	The	Care	Act	2014	applies	to	England.	The	relevant	statute	relating	to	personalisation	for	Wales	is	The	Social	Services	and	Well-being	Act	(Wales)	2014.		For	Scotland	it	is	The	Social	Care	(Self-directed	support)	(Scotland)	Act	2013.				2	HSCIC	defines	DPs	to	include	existing	and	new	direct	payments	and	personal	budgets			3	These are three-way classifications of ‘Predominantly Rural’ (R50 and R80), 
‘Significant Rural’ (SR), or ‘Predominantly Urban’ (OU, MU, and LU) obtained 
for each CSSR (see: www.ons.org).  
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																																																																																																																																																															4	Figures	are	rounded	to	nearest	5	by	the	data	holder,	additionally	all	figures	less	than	5	are	reported	as	0	by	the	data	holder,	
